



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

When at last Burr's expedition arrived on the lower Mississippi, it numbered barely sixty men with no more arms and provisions, says Mr. McCaleb, than a band of Washita colonists might prudently have carried. Indeed, Burr knew before he left Tennessee that Wilkinson had come to terms with the Spaniards and that there could be no war (p. 266). Burr surrendered and was bound over to meet the grand jury, which, like the Kentucky grand juries, found no true bill against him. The judge, however, unaccountably refused to release him, and, fearing for his life if he should fall into Wilkinson's hands, he fled, was captured near Fort Stoddert, and thence taken to Richmond (p. 275). Jefferson was deceived completely by Wilkinson; and when others manifested doubt in regard to the latter's stories and criticized Jefferson's actions, he took it for partizan malice. At length he lost his temper and his self-control, and began to act obstinately and vindictively without due poise of mind and dignity of manner. The book is without a hero; Burr, Wilkinson, Jefferson are all seen in the light of their shortcomings. Only Burr could say in after times, "What was treason in me thirty years ago, is patriotism now."

The book is not an easy one to read. The narrative, complex at best, is often burdened with controversial matter. There are many long quotations. Though important to the argument and valuable to the reader to whom they are not elsewhere accessible, they often challenge study rather than carry instant conviction. In some important points the testimony is contradictory, and it is only by looking to the weight of evidence that a conclusion can be reached. But Mr. McCaleb's interpretation of the conspiracy, in its most important phases at least, will undoubtedly win acceptance. Few books in recent years have been more enlightening upon their particular themes than this book is.

FREDERICK W. MOORE.

A History of the Peninsular War. By CHARLES OMAN, M.A. Vol. II. From Corunna to Talavera. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Henry Frowde. 1903. Pp. viii, 664.)

PROFESSOR OMAN's first volume was duly welcomed. Now comes the second in a solid, sumptuous form, without and within. It is entitled to equal welcome.

The Peninsular War is a maze. Except for the one campaign of Napoleon, and the masterly labors of Wellington, there is no *ensemble* to it. Most events seem to occur in a haphazard way. Much of the good work done proves worthless. "To endeavor to grasp a Spanish corps," says our author, "was like clutching at a ball of quicksilver; the mass dispersed in dribblets between the fingers of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately united to form a new force." The terrain was shut in and cut up, so that larger operations were lacking. Victual was scant. The English, aided by the natives, barely existed; the French starved. After reading of Ulm and Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland, and marching in plenty with the Grand Army from

the Channel down the Danube and back, and thence through north Germany to the confines of Russia, this is like turning from wholesale to retail, from a Lyons silk-factory to a counter in the *Bon Marché*. Not that there wanted heroism — think of Saragossa; not that peril was lacking — over half a million men there met a soldier's fate. Yet the influence of the Peninsular struggle on the wars of the Empire is apt to be overrated. Had it begun sooner, had it not been complicated by other and greater European contests, who doubts that Napoleon would have swept out the English and annexed Spain and Portugal to France? For if at sea the Emperor's admirals and fleets could in no wise vie with the British, on land, led by himself, his lieutenants and army corps were efficient far beyond anything the Peninsular allies could put into the field. But this war grew to dangerous proportions only when the career of the great soldier had begun its downward course, when he himself had not sufficient time to devote to this part of the continent, and when the fostering care of Wellington, who quite outclassed every marshal ever trained by Napoleon, could make it a potent factor in his ruin.

Some of the difficulties met by Professor Oman in his undertaking are thus stated: "If we look at the month of May, 1809, we find that the following six disconnected series of operations were all in progress at once, and that each has to be treated as a part of one great scheme of strategy — (1) Soult's campaign against Wellesley in Northern Portugal, (2) Ney's invasion of the Asturias, (3) Victor's and Cuesta's movements in Estramadura, (4) Sebastiani's demonstrations against Venegas in La Mancha, (5) Suchet's contest with Blake in Aragon, (6) St. Cyr's attempt to subdue Catalonia." This variety of operations was partly the outcome of risings of the different sections, headed by the several juntas. It was not strictly the result of one pure strategic plan like, say, the campaign of 1806; and while the latter may be narrated intelligently and in sufficient detail in one or two long chapters, it requires as much space and more labor for the historian to treat each of the former.

Military criticism is now an open book, where he who runneth may read. While the conduct of war more than ever requires training, the factors of a campaign may be well seized and presented historically by the civilian. This was proved by the late John C. Ropes, and the demonstration is being continued on a larger scale by Oman. Added to fresh material, he has personally equipped himself well for his task by visiting the ground, and by reading his authorities, old and new, with the field spread before him. Only he who has done this can appreciate the difference between printed pages, even elucidated by good maps, and the actuality of the terrain itself. Oman has secured the coöperation of numerous experts in his chosen field, and has left no stone unturned to verify every statement of his story. You will not quarrel with his facts, though you may with his deductions. You will agree amiably to differ with him, for while he lacks not a most forceful way of putting things, he is fair enough to rouse only your disagreement, and not your antagonism.

It is difficult to criticize so important a work volume by volume. The first covered the period ending at Corunna; the present one, out of a period of over six years, covers only January to September, 1809. Its central incident is the battle of Talavera. Here Wellesley continued the defensive battle tactics begun at Vimiero, in which the steady line of redcoats on a hill awaited the charge of the Gallic columns, met them, winded after a hard ascent, with a hurricane of bullets, shot, and shell, and then fell upon them with the bayonet. This has been called a triumph of the line against the column. It does not seem so. Ever since 1792 the French had been demonstrating the superiority, as things then were, of the column to the line. The knell of the column was only sounded when the infantry arm was made to carry to a distance. The success of the line was a nice calculation by Wellington of what the natural characteristics of the two opponents would enable each to do and suffer. Reverse the situation and imagine the British line charging up hill against the French column under cover, of being met by a withering volley at the top and then by the countercharge of a deep body. The line would have inevitably been ruptured and driven back. Wellington's greatness in the Peninsula depends not on the discovery of any new tactical theory, but on his wonderful common sense in grasping the conditions—such as lack of cohesiveness of his allies, uncertainty of home support, limited resources in men and food—and his skill in using a Fabian policy to meet the conditions.

The description of the campaign and battle of Talavera is clear. Written from the English standpoint, it bears a different flavor from the French accounts; but it is fair enough to both sides. Indeed, the entire tone of the book is fair. Oman's appreciation of the Great Duke, with his strength and his marked limitations, is essentially well poised for an Englishman. He is not a hero-worshiper of Napoleon as Napier was. Yet he strives to do equity, although from his naturally English point of view, the French reports are now and then "mendacious." As a fact, from the standpoint of the enemy, every despatch is mendacious. Even the most conservative battle reports are full of errors, if not prejudice. The reverse of the battle coin differs widely from the obverse. A Frenchman would use a similar word in speaking of many English reports.

The most interesting single fact given by Oman is that Crauford's celebrated march of twenty-two hours to reach Talavera in season for the battle was forty-three miles, and not sixty-two, as stated by Napier. The latter distance within the day and night, while accepted out of deference to Napier, has always been a source of stumbling to those who have made forced marches with even the most seasoned infantry. Despite the present cut in distance to what one can understand, the march remains one of the very best in history.

This volume shows, perhaps more forcibly than its predecessor, that the author is engaged in preparing a great historical work. One could wish that this century began with less to do, so that one might follow the author in all his details. Oman believes that what is worth doing at all

is worth doing well, and every page is interesting. The manufacture of the work is typically good. The illustrations are apt and the charts excellent.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.

The Independence of the South American Republics. A Study in Recognition and Foreign Policy. By FREDERIC L. PAXSON. (Philadelphia: Ferris and Leach. 1903. Pp. 288.)

THE title to this excellent little volume gives its intention and scope, and Mr. Paxson has with rare restraint confined himself strictly to his subject. Before the American Revolution there was no theory of recognition, and for a state to recognize a revolted colony before the mother-country had given recognition was tantamount to intervention, and a cause for war. The action of France and Holland in recognizing the United States was based upon interested motives, and therefore could not furnish a precedent. The attitude taken by the United States towards France during the French Revolution, in recognizing any government accepted by the French people, was a decided step in advance, but it was not until the doctrine of neutrality had been defined by Washington's cabinet, in the Proclamation of 1794, that the doctrine of recognition could assume a definite form.

Mr. Paxson outlines clearly this rise of a doctrine of recognition, and as clearly recounts the events passing in South America which led to the revolt against Spain and eventually to independence. He then describes the attitude of the United States from the first mission of Poinsett to the recognition of the late Spanish colonies as sovereign states, and that of England from the beginnings of her somewhat uncertain policy to the like issue. He makes use of the manuscripts in the Department of State at Washington, the Adams papers at Quincy, and the records in the Foreign Office, London. His study is based upon original sources.

While England approached the question of recognition from the commercial side, the United States took the higher ground of international right. Action in the matter involved some delicate consideration of neutral rights. Spain looked upon the South American states as rebellious colonies, and therefore not subject to recognition until such action on her own part should admit their claim to be treated as equals. The United States government, on the other hand, regarded the situation as one of civil war, and the parties already on a plane of equality. A recognition given too hastily might injure the cause it was intended to further, and yet inaction on the part of the government would favor positive breaches of neutrality, such as had given the port of Baltimore so bad a name, and delayed the successful issue of certain negotiations between the United States and Spain. Factious attempts by Clay to force the administration to recognize, even at the expense of war, and the action of the agents of the South American states in demanding recognition or offering treaties without instructions or powers, complicated the position of the Executive, but were not successful. Every opportunity was afforded to Spain